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When individuals do not stop at the skin 
 
ALAN BARNARD 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines contemporary hunter-gatherer societies in Africa and 
elsewhere in light of the social brain and the distributed mind hypotheses. 
One question asked is whether African hunter-gatherers offer the best model 
for societies at the dawn of symbolic culture, or whether societies elsewhere 
on globe offer better models. The paper argues for the former.  
Theoretical notions touched on include sharing and exchange, 
universal kin classification, and the relation between group size and social 
networks. Reinterpretations are offered of classic anthropological notions 
such as Wissler’s age-area hypothesis, Durkheim’s collective consciousness 
and Lévi-Strauss’s elementary structures of kinship. The author also 
discusses his theory of the co-evolution of language and kinship through three 
phases (signifying, syntactic and symbolic) and the subsequent breakdown of 
the principles of the symbolic phase across much of the globe in Neolithic 
times. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
‘When individuals do not stop at the skin’ has become a common notion in 
psychology, in sociology, in anthropology and even in archaeology. In the last 
instance, for example, Clive Gamble and Martin Porr have discussed the idea of an 
individual in an environment which includes both material objects and other 
individuals. They have argued for the definition of the individual as ‘a social actor 
constituted by his/her relation to these other individuals’ (Gamble & Porr 2005: 10). 
This notion of the individual, rather than individual as agent, is the one I want to 
explore in this paper.  
I will examine this idea in ways that I think can throw light on human 
evolution, especially with regard to its relation to notions like culture, community, 
kinship, and communication. My examples are drawn mainly through my own 
experience of field research among southern African hunter-gatherers and semi-
hunter-gatherers and their neighbours. I want to look too at what I see as an 
unattributed background to the distributed mind hypothesis which lies in social 
theory. I want to bring this together with aspects of Robin Dunbar’s extended brain 
hypothesis (e.g. Dunbar 1998), which forms one of the two bases of my own recent 
theory of the co-evolution of language and kinship. 
 
 
THE COHERENCE OF CULTURE-BEARING SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
 
Boyd and Richerson on ‘culture’ 
 
In The Origin and Evolution of Cultures, Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson have 
collected a wonderful set of their own papers, written over a thirty-year period but all 
arguing a single thesis. For Boyd and Richerson, culture is part of human biology, but 
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operates not only directly through biological mechanisms but also by analogy to 
them. Let me mention two of the papers in the volume.  
In the first, they consider ‘Why culture is common, but cultural evolution is 
rare’ (Boyd & Richerson 2005 [1996]: 52-65). They point out that cultural variation 
and cultural learning occur in a number of animal species, from chimpanzees to 
pigeons, but that only in humans does accumulated cultural change regularly lead to 
the evolution of behaviour beyond that which could be invented by an individual. 
Their argument is short, but it is complex. If I may change their terminology slightly, 
they suggest that some form of socially-conscious learning, through observation, 
imitation and the deliberate transmission of ideas, is necessary to build culture. All 
this requires that individuals possess a theory of mind: the capacity to understand 
that others may have different ideas in their heads from oneself. From this, cultural 
evolution follows: the abilities to make a better tool, tell a story or elaborate on one, 
draw a picture or see a picture and understand. I agree with Boyd and Richerson, 
and would go further than they do. Because of the integrated nature of cultural 
domains (kinship, religion, and so on), after a certain stage of cultural sophistication, 
cultural accumulation makes cultural evolution virtually inevitable. What that stage of 
cultural accumulation is, must remain debateable. Presumably too, change may 
occur either gradually or in revolutionary transformations. 
In the second paper, written with colleagues Monique Borgerhoff-Mulder and 
William Durham, Boyd and Richerson (2005 [1997]: 310-36) pose the question: ‘Are 
cultural phylogenies possible?’ Through analogies with biology, they propose four 
hypotheses relating to the possible reconstruction of such cultural phylogenies. (1) 
Cultures as ‘species’, either isolated from each other or so structurally coherent that 
the borrowing of traits is limited. (2) Cultures as integrated but hierarchical systems, 
with peripheral elements that may be borrowed and core elements that will not be. (3) 
Cultures as assemblages, each coherent, but none easily definable as a core domain 
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or a peripheral one. (4) Cultures as collections of things, operating without the 
functional coherence of a hierarchy of domains (Boyd & Richerson 2005: 317-19).  
My own vision of culture, which I argued in Hunters and Herders of Southern 
Africa (Barnard 1992), is similar to the second of these, with core elements and 
peripheral, and in my view with core elements shared with related cultures. In other 
words, although I now question the degree to which it is useful to think of ‘cultures’ as 
countable units, I believe that entities such as Khoisan culture, Australian Aboriginal 
culture, or Lowland South American culture, or even Western culture, each have 
within them not only core elements but also underlying structural principles. These 
underlying structural principles, not random sets of traits, are what distinguish one 
culture complex, culture area, or ethnographic region, from another. Usually, there 
will be a point of common cultural origin, but convergence, with new shared core 
features, is also possible—as in what some linguists call a Sprachbund or linguistic 
area (e.g. Güldemann 1998). 
 
 
Cultural structures in kinship 
 
Two Khoisan individuals may live in different countries, thousands of miles apart, 
speak different languages, and practise different subsistence activities, but they may 
share the same understandings of how to classify each other and behave towards 
each other through shared kinship ideology and its principles, like the 
joking/avoidance dichotomy, the alternation of generations, the principle of universal 
kin classification, and the rule ‘When in doubt, treat a friend as a “grandrelative”’. 
Among Khoe-speaking Central Bushmen or San, these are derived in part from 
common principles of Khoe kinship, but shared elements also figure typically in other 
hunter-gatherer societies and are found among non-Khoe Khoisan like Ju/’hoansi 
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and !Xóõ. (Khoe is a subset of Khoisan, and includes both Khoekhoe herders and 
Central Bushman or San hunter-gatherers.) 
More subtly, structural convergence and the accumulation of peripheral 
features may alter the ways in which underlying principles are played out. I have 
argued, for example, that when some hundreds of years ago a Khoe system known 
as Naro (Nharo) borrowed Ju/’hoan (!Kung) personal naming practices, the relevant 
kinship term was slotted into the structurally-different Naro system to replace two 
previous Khoe terms (Barnard 1988). The naming practice, through which Ju’hoansi 
and Naro receive the names of senior grandrelatives (grandparents or, loosely, 
uncles/aunts) and trace kinship through names as if namesake equals ‘self’, renders 
the previous senior/junior distinction, still found in all other Khoe systems, irrelevant. I 
did fieldwork with Naro, and my Naro name is !A/e (in Nguni-based Naro 
orthography, spelled Qace). If I meet another !A/e, I call him ‘grandfather’ or 
‘grandchild’. It is immaterial whether he is simply a namesake, or (if I were a Naro) 
my real grandfather, cross-uncle, cross-cousin, cross-nephew or grandchild. These 
genealogical positions are terminologically all the same—the Naro category I refer to 
in English as ‘grandrelative’. 
At least one cultural domain apart from language, namely kinship, is so 
structured that it always forms a whole (cf. Bickerton 1998). You will never find, 
anywhere among Homo sapiens, half a kinship system. You will of course find 
systems in transition, but they always seek stabilization. Partly, this is due to the 
principle of uniform reciprocals. In any system, if I call someone, say, ‘nephew’ or 
‘niece’, they will call me ‘uncle’ or ‘aunt’. ‘Father’, ‘brother’, or ‘son’ (or their female 
equivalents) are not options. We are born into kinship structures, and these more 
than any other cultural realm both constrain our behaviour and define us as 
individuals.  
This principle is even more true in hunter-gatherer societies than in others, 
because almost invariably such societies possess universal kin classification: every 
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member of society stands in a precise kin relationship to every other (Barnard 1978). 
The mechanisms will vary from place to place: egocentrically through friendship or 
name relationships in Africa, or socio-centrically through moiety and genealogical 
level in South America, or through moiety, section or subsection membership in 
Australia. But in such systems, there is no such thing as non-kin. The real test of 
universality is classification of outsiders. I am not Naro and therefore have no Naro 
genealogy, but through my name and my namesakes in their genealogies, every one 
of the 15,000 Naro can, and must, classify me individually as belonging to some 
category in relation to themselves. Particularly for opposite-sex people, this 
determines whether to behave in a formal way (e.g. parent/child or brother/sister), or 
informal way (e.g. grandrelative or husband/wife)–how close to sit, whether to tell 
rude jokes or not, and so on. If, for example, someone’s father-in-law is called !A/e, 
the fact that I happen to bear that name, even though I am not really a Naro, means 
that they will classify me and treat me as if I were their father-in-law. (If I were 
actually a Naro and therefore had a Naro genealogy, and I were the older, I would do 
the classifying and they would reciprocate appropriately.) 
Finally, it is worth recalling that where everyone is kin, possibly no-one is 
structurally privileged (in terms of social category) for the kind of sharing that we 
might think of as characterizing kin relations in other kinds of society. Of course, 
Khoisan hunter-gatherers, like anyone else, recognize the difference between close 
kin and distant, but they also have other mechanisms to enable the redistribution of 
resources. The best known, though not the only one, is the relationship of delayed 
balanced reciprocity known as hxaro (Wiessner 1982) which transcends kin category. 
It is, in a sense, quasi-kinship by choice. Ironically, hxaro (or //aĩ, as some groups call 
it) is not quite unique to hunter-gatherers, and not found among the majority of 
Bushman groups. Yet for those groups that practise it, it is a highly effective social 
and economic tool. Individuals choose their partners and define their place in the 
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world according to their partnerships, which in turn allow access to the resources 
which their partners own. 
 
 
CULTURE, COMMUNITY AND LOCAL GROUPS 
 
Ernest Gellner once defined ‘culture’, and defined it in two quite different ways. In its 
more abstract sense, he argued, culture is ‘a system of constraints’ analogous to 
language, which in turn is itself ‘a system of prohibitions’ (Gellner 1989: 515-519). In 
both cases, language and culture, our predisposition for acquiring and adhering to 
such limiting behaviours is part of what makes us human. In its more specific sense, 
Geller reasoned, culture is ‘what a population shares and what turns it into a 
community’ (1989: 515), while a community is simply ‘a population which shares a 
culture’.  
 
 
Locality and community 
 
The group that Robert Layton and Sean O’Hara (this volume) call the ‘community’ is 
possibly the most socially important unit for hunter-gatherers—in the present or in 
prehistoric times. Essentially, this is the unit which is often in the southern African 
literature called the ‘nexus’, or what I have called the ‘band cluster’. If it aggregates 
seasonally, it is what North Amerianists sometimes call the ‘maximal band’ or ‘macro-
band’. It is larger than the ‘band’, ‘camp’ or what Australianists used to call the 
‘horde’, but smaller than what is considered in traditional Australianist terminology a 
‘tribe’, or elsewhere for hunter-gatherers a ‘society’ or ‘speech community’. The latter, 
larger unit is more akin to Gellner’s idea of a ‘community’. In my primary fieldwork 
area in central-western Botswana, the speech community is the people who speak 
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Naro. The band cluster, or community I worked in, is N//oa//xai, and the camp or 
band location I lived in for most of my early fieldwork was called ≠Aã. During my one-
year stay at ≠Aã in 1974-75, the population varied from about 20 to 25. On return 
visits I found population size down to zero, in 1979, and then up to about 25 again in 
1982. None of the people of ≠Aã in 1975 had returned in 1982, although I caught up 
with several of them in nearby locations. When I visited the area in 1995, ≠Aã had 
again been abandoned, but individuals who had lived there in the 1970s were located 
nearby. 
In fact, ≠Aã was, and is, a specific location—more permanent in residence 
than what we might usually want to label a ‘camp’ but much more fluid in composition 
than what we tend to think of as a ‘band’. Meyer Fortes’s (1958) idea of the 
‘developmental cycle of domestic groups’ comes to mind. Working with Ghanaian 
agriculturalists, Fortes deduced the temporal patterns that must lie behind what the 
fieldworker sees. The duration of the cycle, from nuclear family compound, to 
extended family compound, to death and division, and so on, might take 40 or 60 
years. The ethnographer, though, might be there for just two years, and must 
recognise that the different observed social units in fact represent different points in a 
temporal sequence: that one over there will become like this one over here in 15 
years, and then split to become two units like those over the hill. In other words, the 
dynamics of group structure in, say, a 60-year cycle cannot be observed in one or 
two years in the field, but must be inferred. Through deduction, then, the seemingly 
random movement of individuals on the ground becomes the temporal pattern in the 
ethnographer’s mind. 
 One thing that interests me here is whether hunter-gatherers conceptualize 
their social units in terms of such temporal patterns. The evidence of ethnography, 
for example on the Ju/’hoansi (Marshall 1976: 156-200; Lee 1979: 333-369), 
suggests that they do. They know the history of their own individual movements 
between locations, and of others, and they explain their residence and use of 
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resources in terms of returning to where they lived, their parents lived, or their 
grandparents lived, and therefore where they retain rights in band territory and band 
membership. 
 
 
Are hunter-gatherers different? 
 
Are hunter-gatherers different from non-hunter-gatherers? Recent perspectives in 
archaeology suggest that there was no Neolithic revolution. Clive Gamble (2007), for 
example, in Origins and Revolutions argues that human cultural evolution is gradual 
and marked by an uneven gradient of development from instruments to containers. 
Its timescale covers the period before symbolic culture up until the Neolithic and the 
times after. In his view, there was no Neolithic Revolution and no Human or Symbolic 
Revolution either. Yet, widely-accepted notions in social anthropology distinguish 
between hunter-gatherer and non-hunter-gatherer ways of life. The most influential of 
these is James Woodburn’s (e.g. 1980) distinction between immediate and delayed-
return economies. Woodburn argues that once a people have made this economic 
transition, their way of thinking is altered. Immediate-return peoples do not plan for 
the future in their economic activities and are reluctant to invest time in making 
complex hunting equipment, let alone spending the time required to grow crops or 
look after livestock. Even Australian Aborigines, in Woodburn’s words, ‘farm out’ their 
women through complex kinship arrangements, thus denying themselves the status 
of an immediate-return economic ideology. 
However, in my view both Gamble and Woodburn go too far in making their 
respective points. There was a ‘Neolithic Revolution’—in the sense that the transition 
from food-gathering and hunting to food production was, ultimately, revolutionary. 
There is no doubt that it was slow and gradual, taking perhaps about 1500 years 
according to estimates for both Europe and southern Africa (see Barnard 2007: 17). 
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The revolutionary point, if it can be dated, occurred not at the beginning (as 
Woodburn’s distinction would imply), but rather at the end of the long Neolithic 
transition. I have suggested this indirectly in several papers on what I have called the 
foraging or hunting-and-gathering mode of thought (e.g. Barnard 2002; 2007). 
Neolithic and post-Neolithic thinking involve permanent settlement and planning for 
the future. For example, a number of things change with the acquisition of livestock: 
the need for herding skills, the search for grazing, the possession of a guaranteed 
supply of meat, the practice of trading it as opposed to just sharing it, the longer work 
hours required for herding over hunting and gathering, the possibility of increasing 
the number of possessions though sale or trade of livestock, greater worries over the 
supply of water, and above all the necessity to plan for the future of the herd and the 
human social group. A similar set of attributes is applicable to the acquisition of 
cultivating practices (Barnard 2007: 16-17).  
 Figure 1 shows an example from my paper on modes of thought through the 
Neolithic transition. It illustrates just one of several changes in perception required 
when one moves from hunting and gathering, to herding or horticulture. An 
individual’s relations with the group change with regard to the contrast between 
accumulation and immediate consumption. Accumulation, which was in hunter-
gatherer times anti-social, becomes social through the ability to pass possessions, 
including livestock, through the generations. This is contrasted with immediate 
consumption, which is not a purely individual act for hunter-gatherers, but a social 
one, as it is equated with sharing. One can think of the model as ‘hunter-gatherers 
consume’ or ‘hunter-gatherers share’, but I find it more meaningful to think of it as 
‘non-hunter-gatherers accumulate (but manage to do this in a socially acceptable 
way)’. 
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FIGURE 1 
 
 
 
 
THE DISTRIBUTED MIND IN SOCIAL THEORY 
 
The distributed mind hypothesis suggests mind beyond the self, broadly in the sense 
an individual’s mind is located in his or her environment as much as it is within his or 
her brain. Particularly in archaeology, this is generally taken to imply that the material 
world, especially material culture, shapes the thinking of individuals just as much as 
an individual shapes the artefacts of that culture (see also Gamble’s paper in this 
volume). Yet environments can be social as well as natural, and immaterial as well 
as material. In this sense, earlier ideas in the social sciences, as well as in the 
biological sciences (cf. Wilson 2005), can also imply a distributed mind. Examples 
from the social sciences might include Durkheim’s conscience collective (or 
‘collective consciousness’), Bateson’s version of the early twentieth-century idea of a 
cultural ‘configuration’, and Lévi-Strauss’s esprit humaine (often translated as 
‘collective unconscious’).  
Durkheim’s ‘collective consciousness’ is a social mind exerting its collective 
will on individuals. In his statistical study of suicide in France, Durkheim (1951 [1897]) 
showed that even this seemingly ultimate individual act is in part socially-determined. 
There is a correlation between religion and the incidence of suicide. Protestants and 
Jews in nineteenth-century France were more prone to kill themselves than were 
Catholics. Similarly, Gregory Bateson (1980 [1936]: 30-31) described the 
‘configuration’ of a culture as a combination of its ‘ethos’, or emotional emphases, 
and its ‘eidos’, or system of cognitive processes. Lévi-Strauss’s ‘human spirit’ or 
‘collective unconscious’ is a mind distributed not among members of a single culture 
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or society, but one distributed throughout humankind as a whole. This is most 
obvious to me in Lévi-Strauss’s early work on kinship (Lévi-Strauss 1969 [1949]), in 
which he suggests that every kinship system in the world can be defined according to 
the way it utilises the generating principles that underlie all human kinship structures. 
Other anthropologists, no doubt, would point to Lévi-Strauss’s writings on the savage 
mind, totemism, or mythology, in all of which the seemingly culturally-specific is 
explained as part of deeper and universal cultural determinants.  
A somewhat more mystical and much more extreme version is found too in 
anthropology, in A.L. Kroeber’s (1917) theory of ‘the superorganic’. In Kroeber’s 1917 
article of that title, the individual was pushed to the side in favour of cultural forces 
which drive human invention. Kroeber points to the fact that the telescope, the 
telephone, photography, the phonograph and so on were each simultaneously 
invented by two or more people; and oxygen, Neptune and the North and South 
Poles similarly discovered almost simultaneously by more than one individual. His 
article brought immediate criticism though, from Edward Sapir (1917), who attacked 
Kroeber for overemphasizing material aspects of culture. Sapir attributed invention in 
philosophical, religious and aesthetic activities to autonomous individual activity, 
albeit activity by culture-bearing individuals in social contexts. 
Let me sum up this brief excursion into social theory with three points. First, 
notions resembling the present-day concepts of ‘distributed mind’ are not all recent. 
They have been around in sociological and anthropological thought for some time, 
and I know that psychologists can cite examples from their discipline as well. 
Secondly, as the earlier ideas suggest, there are different levels of collective 
consciousness or mind distribution. They need not be confined to countable 
‘cultures’, but may be present at any level: from family, community or society to a 
deeper configuration comprising ‘culture’ as a whole, in the abstract. Thirdly, there 
have been serious disagreements, even among close colleagues of the same 
intellectual school, about fundamental things like the locus of culture, the relation 
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between biological, psychological and social phenomena, and whether or not to see 
individuals as embodying culture to such a degree that they cease to be able to act 
as individuals at all. 
The evolutionary question that comes to mind is less how ‘deep’ cultural 
universals may be, but how old. Let me again set aside our current knowledge and 
examine this question of time-depth with reference to a debate from a few decades 
ago. At the ‘Man the Hunter’ conference in 1966, there was a heated exchange 
between Claude Lévi-Strauss and L.R. Hiatt, over the historical and evolutionary 
interpretation of Gidjingali marriage arrangements and of Australian kinship 
structures more broadly (see Hiatt 1968; Lévi-Strauss 1968; Hiatt & Lévi-Strauss 
1968). Let me quote from the post-conference, edited version of Lévi-Strauss’s 
paper.  
Lévi-Strauss (1968: 351) writes: ‘Hiatt has suggested two possible 
explanations for the discrepancy between model and reality in Australian society ….’ 
Lévi-Strauss refers here to Hiatt’s comment that, in order to salvage Lévi-Strauss’s 
idealist interpretation of present-day Australian systems, we might envisage the 
imperfect systems that we see today, either as survivals from a time when behaviour 
did conform to reality, or as ‘a chronologically unrealized unconscious model’ (Hiatt 
1968: 172). ‘However’, Lévi-Strauss continues, 
 
… there is also a third worth considering—that at one time, all this completed 
theory was clearly conceived and invented by native sociologists or 
philosophers. Thus, what we are doing is not building a theory with which to 
interpret the facts, but rather trying to get back to the older native theory at 
the origin of the facts we are trying to explain. After all, we know that mankind 
is about one or two million years old, but while we are ready to grant man this 
great antiquity, we are not ready to grant man a continuous thinking capacity 
during this enormous length of time. I see no reason why mankind should 
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have waited until recent times to produce minds of the caliber of a Plato or an 
Einstein. Already, over two or three hundred thousand years ago, there were 
probably men of a similar capacity, who were probably not applying their 
intelligence to the solution of the same problems as these more recent 
thinkers; instead, they were probably more interested in kinship! (Lévi-Strauss 
1968: 351) 
  
It is worth recalling too Richard Lee and Irven DeVore’s words in the preface 
to Man the Hunter: 
 
We cannot avoid the suspicion that many of us were led to live and work 
among hunters [or hunter-gatherers] because of a feeling that the human 
condition was likely to be more clearly drawn here than among other kinds of 
societies. (Lee & DeVore 1968: ix) 
 
In other words, through the study of contemporary hunter-gatherers we can hope to 
uncover something of an earlier time, when perhaps, if Lévi-Strauss is right, we might 
have seen kinship coming to be debated, or practices being modelled and models 
being practised.  
Exactly when this was of course we do not know, but elsewhere I have 
suggested a trajectory, based in fact on the social brain hypothesis—to which I shall 
now turn. 
 
 
THE SOCIAL BRAIN HYPOTHESIS, LANGUAGE AND KINSHIP 
 
The social brain hypothesis suggests that the anthropoid primate brain evolved along 
with social complexity. In the brain, this involved the expansion of the neocortex, and 
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in society it involved, among other things, a parallel expansion in group size and 
consequent selection for language over grooming as basis of communication around 
the time of Homo erectus (e.g. Dunbar 2001: 190-191).  
 In recent papers, I have coupled this hypothesis with (a) a rough and not 
strictly essential trajectory in relation to fossils hominins, from Homo habilis or Homo 
erectus to Homo heidelbergensis to Homo sapiens, (b) Calvin and Bickerton’s (2000) 
three-phase model of evolution of language: from proto-language (words and 
symbolic communication) to rudimentary language (simple and ambiguous 
sentences) to true language (with full syntax), and (c) a parallel model of the 
evolution of kinship. The last involves a proto-kinship phase of inclusive kinship and 
sharing, which is different from pre-linguistic kin patterns among chimpanzees, 
bonobos or (I speculate) australopithecines; then a rudimentary kinship phase of 
us/them kinship, incest avoidance and exchange of all kinds; and then a full kinship 
phase with universal kin categorization and explicit rules of sharing, exchange and 
kin behaviour. This third phase, which entails loosely Lévi-Straussian elementary 
structures (Lévi-Strauss 1969), eventually breaks down after Neolithization and the 
transition from universal to non-universal classification systems and the re-
emergence of genealogical distance over category as the basis of kin relationships 
(Barnard 2008; 2009). 
 This theory is expressed in Figure 2. There is more to it, of course, but the 
relevance of it here is to suggest that the dawn of Homo, which is traditionally 
regarded as the dawn of tool-making (although this may now be in dispute), also 
marks the beginnings of linguistic communication, which is in turn coupled with the 
evolution of kinship structures. Leslie Aiello and Peter Wheeler (1995) have also 
argued a relation between brain size, gut size and a transition to intensive meat-
eating, which in turn suggests larger group sizes and increasing intellectual abilities 
which are required not only to make tools but to teach tool-making skills. The 
evolution of kinships structures through the phases which I call the signifying, 
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syntactic and symbolic, and on to the destabilising Neolithic, involve until the 
Neolithic an ever-increasing concern with classification, as the basis of identity. An 
individual in human society is never isolated. In a universal system, he is also never 
without specific relationship to everyone else, for kinship does not stop at the family 
but at the very end of social interaction. No individual is non-kin, but always my joking 
partner (e.g. wife or grandmother) or my avoidance partner (e.g. usually a man’s 
sister, or mother).  
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
 
 
 
 
HUMAN NATURE? 
 
Distributed mind and extended brain 
 
The distributed mind hypothesis implies that humans are naturally cultural, and 
possibly that we are naturally cultural to an unlimited degree. Furthermore, culture 
has no bounds, in that at least certain aspects of culture are cumulative and can be 
amplified by the storage capacity of language, and beyond that, by the unnatural 
means of writing or computers. A further comparison with language may be relevant 
here. Marc Hauser, Noam Chomsky and Tecumseh Fitch (2002: 1570) note that 
there is a difference between language as ‘a culturally specific communication 
system’ and language as ‘an internal component of the mind/brain’. The notion of 
culture, it seems to me, could similarly be divided into two forms, with analogous 
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meanings. Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch further discuss the distinction between the 
‘faculty of language in the broad sense’ (FLB) and the ‘faculty of language in the 
narrow sense’ (FLN). The former includes sensory-motor and conceptual-intentional 
systems, whereas the latter includes specifically recursion—the embedding of a 
sentence within a sentence. And they argue that although other animals have FLB, 
only humans have FLN. Recursion, for them, is the single defining property of 
human, as opposed to animal, communication. But the most relevant point they make 
for our discussion here is that to find the mechanism required for the evolution of 
language to include recursion, we probably have to look beyond language itself: they 
suggest to numerical ability, navigation, and (unspecified) social relations.  
 The extended brain hypothesis implies that humans are naturally social, but 
only to a certain degree. More specifically, humans achieve maximal sociality at 
roughly 150 individuals per group (or per ‘community’, which may be larger or 
smaller), according to predictions by neocortex ratio. While there is no limit to culture, 
this seems to be the natural limit to sociality for humans (see Aiello & Dunbar 1993: 
189). However, I question these limits on both counts. It is not that culture has no 
natural bounds or that sociality is impassibly bounded, but rather, that we in our post-
natural age have broken the constraints of nature on the first count and found cultural 
solutions to social boundaries on the second count. Let me explain. In a sense, the 
cultural limits of human nature lie at the end of hunter-gatherer society. And by 
‘hunter-gatherer society’ I mean those societies which function primarily (if not 
exclusively) by hunting and gathering and possess a foraging mode of thought. 
Arguably, the production and processing of vegetables and grain, and the possession 
of edible and milk, yoghurt and cheese-giving animals, does not lie within the ‘natural’ 
confines of a human way of life. It lies easily within human capability, of course, but 
beyond normal human nature.  
Likewise, group sizes of thousands and millions of humans per social entity 
lie clearly within human capability, but well beyond the predictions for humans based 
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on neocortex size alone. Dunbar (e.g. 1993) has explained this with ingenious 
examples of maximal units among anarchical intentional communities such as 
Hutterites. They themselves explain the limit of 150 as the largest community which 
they can sustain without a police force or other hierarchical mechanisms to maintain 
order. Beyond that, we do seem to need such unnatural, and therefore arguably un-
human, hierarchical mechanisms of social constraint. As it happens, I live in a fairly 
self-regulating hamlet (in the Scottish Borders) of almost exactly 150 individuals. It is 
not an intentional community, but an accidental and indeed very diverse one. The 
vast majority of humanity, though, live in villages, towns or cities that are 
considerably larger. They do this by extending not their brains, but their unnatural, 
cultural elaboration of social segmentation and social order.  
 
 
African or Australian? 
 
In an earlier paper (Barnard 1999) I raised the question of which represented the 
better model of early symbolic cultural humanity: contemporary African hunter-
gatherers, or contemporary Australian. I suggested that there are six ways in which 
Australian hunter-gatherers differ from southern African hunter-gatherers, and that 
these are mainly also ways in which the former differ from all other hunter-gatherers. 
These include: belief in the Rainbow Serpent, spiritual relations to land, the 
possession of elaborate forms of totemism, complex rights and obligations to kin 
through clan membership, elaborate marriage rules governed by sociocentric 
categories, and the application of the same classification principles in a larger world 
order which is unified through such principles. All these, it seems to me, are reasons 
for looking elsewhere. African hunter-gatherers, whose social and cosmological 
structures are simpler and more like those of other hunter-gatherers, are more likely 
to represent the earlier form. 
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Let me now add a seventh reason. In a recent paper in The American Journal 
of Human Genetics, Doron Behar et al. (2008) show that the genetic distance 
between different branches of humanity is greatest in Africa, and within Africa 
greatest in southern Africa, and within southern Africa greatest among Khoisan 
peoples. The rest of the world really represents a small subset of human genetic 
diversity (at least in female lines). According to Behar and his colleagues, the 
matrilineal divergence of the Khoisan population was between 150,000 and 90,000 
years ago, and the Out of Africa dispersal between 70,000 and 60,000 years ago. I 
shall return to that point in a moment. 
There are several specific forms kinship classification among southern African 
hunter-gatherers, but broadly these can be collapsed into two basic forms. These 
basic forms are the same the world over (see Barnard 2008: 238-239). One 
emphasizes genealogical distance and the other emphasizes egocentric 
cross/parallel and alternating-generation categories. As among other hunter-
gatherers, both forms are universal, in that everyone is categorized as kin. But unlike 
most Australian or South American systems these operate entirely without 
sociocentric categories. If such categories were embedded within human nature, I 
would expect to find at least one system in Africa too with remnants of them. The 
parallel/cross and alternating-generation categories are not vestiges of these, but 
rather the building blocks of both such egocentric systems and the sociocentric ones 
of Australia and South America. 
On a worldwide scale, my view seems to go against Clark Wissler’s age-area 
hypothesis (e.g. Wissler 1923: 58-61), which for smaller regional units like ‘culture 
areas’, often does work. Wissler’s age-area hypothesis is indeed sustained if we look 
to eastern and southern Africa, and not the whole world, as the relevant unit. In the 
early twentieth century, Wissler hypothesised that typically within a culture area the 
oldest items of culture will be those found on the periphery, not those in the centre. 
That is because the centre is the seat of change, and things diffuse outwards (from 
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centre to periphery). One might ask why this is of any relevance today, in our era of 
absolute dating with radioactive isotopes. Like Sapir’s list, in his argument against 
Kroeber, it is relevant because not all culture is material culture. We might indeed 
want to know which kinship structures, social practices or cosmologies came first 
among modern humans in general or in a subcontinent or region. In a monumental 
book called Configurations of Culture Growth, Kroeber (1944) did eventually try his 
hand at explaining the things Sapir had criticized him for leaving out. Indeed, it is not 
the accumulated specifics, material or ethereal, which define what is in essence a 
relation between culture and individual. It is the configuration, or to borrow the 
Chomskyan phrase, the ‘faculty of culture in the narrow sense’, which allows the 
description of specific social relations to be embedded in abstractions such as a 
‘kinship system’. In my own work (e.g., Barnard 1992), such configurations are as 
often as not definable as structural elements held in common across a culture area or 
region like Khoisan southern Africa or Aboriginal Australia—in other words, larger 
than specific ‘cultures’. The fact that both Aborigines and Bushmen can not only 
classify strangers but commensurate systems when describing them hints at 
cognitive configurations that lie between a ‘culture’ and the universe of cultures. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Let me conclude with a brief return to Behar’s and his colleagues’ paper (Behar et al. 
2008) in light of the social brain and extended mind hypotheses. Humanity is 
descended in the common matriline from a small group of people living between 
210,000 and 140,000 years ago. There are more than 40 mtDNA lineages in the 
African population, but only two such lineages in the Out of Africa migration. This, 
according to Behar, suggests that humanity at the point of dispersal was divided into 
small, isolated groups, and further that matrilineal organization was likely. I would say 
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that uxorilocality would be a better description, but the details of that matter little in 
terms of the wider social organization of the groups. These people of the African 
Middle Stone Age no doubt possessed all the attributes shared by humanity today. 
They also, I believe, possessed specifically those elements of culture and social life 
common to all or nearly all human hunter-gatherers today or in ethnographic 
memory. These would include at least the following: a low population density 
compared to non-hunter-gatherers, a band level of social organization, an egalitarian 
social organization, gender differentiation in subsistence and in ritual, customs 
governing the distribution of the products of hunting and gathering activities, 
universal kin classification, belief in communication with animals or a symbolic 
association between animals and humans (Barnard 1999). They probably had a 
worldview based on twos or fours (not threes), and their religion was one of animism 
or monotheism (not polytheism and probably not totemism, which is dependent on 
more complex relations to land or among groups). And above all, their social order 
was characterized by flexibility, even if their cosmological order was more rigid. 
This society of natural, but fully cultural, humanity spread across the globe 
and became all of us. Those who went south have kept most closely the knowledge 
and social ways of all our ancestors. Those who went elsewhere have all lost 
elements of social structure that are adaptive for southern and eastern African 
hunter-gatherer life and which still characterize many fully-modern hunter-gatherer 
communities in southern and eastern Africa and, though to a lesser extent, 
elsewhere in the world. Such attributes include the individual ability to classify as ‘kin’ 
everyone with whom one normally associates, but nevertheless without the formal 
assignment of individuals to socio-centric categories such as moieties or sections. 
The classification of kin in such a way would be coincident with formally restricting 
but nevertheless empirically flexible rules of marriage. Other attributes would include 
the ability to form groups, aggregate and disperse according to seasonal and other 
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environmental circumstances, and, importantly, the recognition of common cultural 
configurations across physical group boundaries. 
Human nature is within us all, but more precisely embedded within some 
forms of social structure than others. This is not the same thing as hominin nature, 
because in humans language and the consequent development of kinship structures 
replace other forms of social bonding. Human nature is more embedded in the social 
structures of African hunter-gatherer populations than elsewhere because such 
populations, at least until very recently, have been able to maintain relations to land, 
to resources, and to people through symbolic and socio-environmental ideologies 
undoubtedly reminiscent of those once shared by all humanity. It is not that these 
peoples are in any sense primitive, but rather that the rest of us are, though our 
social condition, in a sense deviant: we have lost part of that aspect of human nature 
that defines post-symbolic but pre-political sociality. 
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MESOLITHIC MODE OF THOUGHT
Accumulation Social (equated with 
saving for self and 
dependants)
Immediate consumption Anti-social (equated with 
not saving)
NEOLITHIC MODE OF THOUGHT
Accumulation Anti-social (equated with 
not sharing)
Immediate consumption Social (equated with 
sharing with family and 
community)
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Sharing (immediate consumption) and accumulation (from Barnard 2007, 10). 
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Fig. 2. The co-evolution of language and kinship. 
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Fig. 1. Sharing (immediate consumption) and accumulation (from Barnard 2007, 10). 
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